Demolishing modern moral philosophy, MacIntyre's icon exposes how we lost our way on ethics after the Enlightenment. His radical claim? Our moral language is mere fragments of lost traditions, rendering debates meaningless. Even more shocking: scientific management and bureaucracy aren't progress, but symptoms of our ethical confusion.
After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre, published in 1981, is a philosophical work that seeks to understand the moral crises of the modern world by investigating the historical development and subsequent fragmentation of moral discourse. It's a challenge to contemporary ethical theories, suggesting that modern morality lacks a rational basis and that attempts to find universal, impartial principles have largely failed. Might our modern understanding of ethics itself be flawed, rooted in a misunderstanding of our past? \n \n The genesis of MacIntyre’s thesis can be seen emerging from late 20th-century anxieties regarding the rise of emotivism and the perceived relativistic nature of moral claims. While not a direct response to any single historical event, After Virtue reflects a broader intellectual climate characterized by disillusionment with grand narratives of progress and a re-evaluation of Enlightenment ideals. It posits a return to Aristotelian virtue ethics as a potential solution to the perceived incoherence of modern moral philosophy, arguing that any attempt to understand morality must begin with an understanding of its historical context. \n \n Over time, After Virtue has become a cornerstone of contemporary virtue ethics, influencing theological, political, and sociological debates. While celebrated for its critique of modern moral theory and its call for a return to Aristotelian traditions, it has also faced criticisms for its historical interpretations and its proposed solution to the problems it identifies. Interpretations range from endorsements as a crucial diagnosis of modern moral failings to rejections as a nostalgic oversimplification of complex historical realities. Its continued relevance raises questions about the nature of moral progress, the role of tradition in ethical discourse, and the very possibility of a shared moral vocabulary. \n \n To
day, After Virtue remains a central text in philosophical ethics. Its legacy lies not only in its substantive arguments but also in its capacity to provoke ongoing debate about the foundations of morality in a rapidly changing world. Does MacIntyre's diagnosis accurately reflect the state of contemporary ethics, and more importantly, does his retrieval of Aristotelian virtue offer a viable path forward? These questions continue to fuel philosophical discourse and invite renewed reflection on the nature of virtue and the possibility of a coherent moral life.
Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue delivers a piercing critique of modernity’s moral landscape, a landscape he sees fragmented by emotivism and the loss of a coherent moral tradition rooted in Aristotelian teleology. This perspective frames how one might approach numerous philosophical questions. For instance, the question of whether "'Is moral truth objective or relative to cultures?'" becomes particularly relevant. MacIntyre argues against moral relativism, contending that the Enlightenment project, in its attempt to establish universal, rational moral principles, ultimately failed, leaving us with a subjective understanding of morality where values are merely expressions of personal preference. He suggests that true morality must be grounded in a shared understanding of the human telos, our purpose and end, and this is only discoverable within particular traditions, which would seem to argue against the radical notion that "'Everyone creates their own version of truth.'" \n \n MacIntyre's focus on tradition raises questions about the role of the past in shaping our moral understanding. Should “‘Ancient wisdom be more reliable than modern science?’” While he wouldn't dismiss science outright, he would insist that moral knowledge can't be divorced from the historical narratives and practices of specific communities. These traditions provide the context for understanding virtues as character traits necessary for achieving the good life within that community. Thus, MacIntyre might see ancient wisdom as offering a more coherent and teleologically grounded moral framework than the fragmented and individualistic ethos of modernity. This emphasis, however, confronts the tension of "'Should tradition limit moral progress?'" MacIntyre acknowledges the possibility of moral progress within a tradition but cautions against the wholesale rejection of established practices and be
liefs in favor of abstract, ahistorical principles. \n \n The connection between virtue and religion also emerges, bringing to the forefront the question “‘Is divine grace necessary for virtue?’” MacIntyre, while not explicitly theological, acknowledges the historical role of religion, particularly Christianity, in shaping Western moral traditions. While he offers a secular argument for virtue ethics, he suggests that religious narratives and practices have been essential in cultivating and sustaining the virtues. In this understanding, then, one could argue that Divine Grace is indirectly necessary, since the virtues one gains are, in part, transmitted through religious narratives. This consideration naturally leads to inquiries like “‘Is genuine free will exist?’” and “‘Is divine revelation necessary for moral knowledge?’” MacIntyre positions himself in a way that stresses that free will exists (as part of human agency) to pursue a virtuous life, and that divine revelation isn’t a necessary perquisite to moral knowledge. It does open discussions on whether faith, as it relates to religion, is “‘more about experience or tradition?’” MacIntyre would likely weigh in on the latter. \n \n MacIntyre’s project also invites reflection on the role of community. “‘Must religion be communal?’” MacIntyre believes that moral character is formed within specific communities that share a common understanding of the good. While he doesn’t necessarily emphasize the need for religion to be communal, he emphasizes the need for moral practices to be. Further, he explores the value of the individual versus the whole and would be interested in addressing, “‘Should we value individual rights over collective welfare?’” In this question, MacIntyre, if compelled to choose, would likely put priority on the collective welfare. He believes that individual rights can conflict with the common go
od, but he still acknowledges their need, making them both of equal import. \n \n Ultimately, After Virtue challenges us to reconsider the foundations of our moral beliefs and practices. It pushes us to ask not just what we should do, but who we ought to become, and within what tradition we can discover and cultivate the virtues necessary for living a flourishing human life. This approach highlights whether “‘Is meaning found or created?’” In MacIntyre’s view, it would be found.
Notre Dame
USA